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Abstract
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Policy Research Working Paper 5858
Do public sector employees earn less than their 
counterparts in the private sector? This paper addresses 
this question in the case of Peru, a country where civil 
service reform is being debated yet the only available 
empirical studies on wage differentials date back to the 
late 1980s. Using data from the 2009 national household 
survey, the authors perform a multiple step analysis. 
First, they estimate a single equation with a public sector 
dummy, which is found to be statistically significant 
and positive when only monetary wages are taken into 
account. However, when in-kind payments and bonuses 
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are included to measure compensation, the analysis finds 
a private sector premium. Second, they estimate for 
public and formal private employees two distinct wage 
functions, including the inverse Mills ratio. This takes 
into account the selection bias resulting from workers 
self-selecting into the public or private sector. Third, these 
results are used to decompose wage differentials using 
the standard Oaxaca-Blinder approach. The results show 
that the compensation differentials are not significant 
except for the sub-sample of employees that achieved a 
postgraduate degree. 
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1. Introduction 
Public sector wages are often under the political spotlight. When governments face budgetary 
pressures public sector wages are one of the areas where governments can make meaningful 
adjustments, as the wage bill typically forms a significant portion of public expenditures. But 
public sector pay can also come under the spotlight in good times. For example, politicians in 
office may want to signal their austerity by pointing to public sector wage freezes. At the same 
time, public sector compensation needs to be high enough to attract skilled workers to perform 
the duties of the public administration.
2 At times, the political will to show  fiscal restraint and 
the practical need to keep the public administ ration running leads to creative solutions by 
which public salaries may be frozen but supplementary payments or benefits are raised so as to 
increase compensation. All of this makes it more difficult to know the true compensation of 
public sector employees and  how their compensation  compares with that of workers  in the 
private sector. Yet, answers to those questions are indeed informative for any eviden ce-based 
policy discussion on public sector pay. 
Whether public sector wages are higher or lower than in the  formal  private sector is a  
particularly relevant piece of information for countries that are considering civil service reform 
options.  One such  country is Peru, where since 2008 a new Civil Service Public Authority 
(Autoridad Nacional del Servicio Civil – SERVIR) has been tasked with the goal of modernizing 
the public administration through the implementation of a civil service reform. In fact, the 2011 
budget law calls on the Ministry of Economy and Finance to put forward by June 30, 2011 a 
draft law to reform public sector pay.
3 It is in this context that the paper aims to contribute to 
the  policy  discussion  by  providing  an  empirical  analysis  of  public-private  sector  wage 
differentials in Peru. 
The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, we show that any analysis of public-private 
sector pay differentials ought to take into account not only wages but also in -kind payments 
and bonuses that employees may receive. This is an issue that is seldom raised  in the existing 
literature, which typically focuses only on monetary wages.   
Second, the analysis of pay differentials in Peru is timely since the existing evidence on public-
private sector wage differentials in Peru dates back to  the late 1980s (Van der Gaag, Stelcner 
                                                           
2 As many authors have noted, the secure nature of a public sector job may imply that compensation in the public 
sector may not need to be as high as in the private sector while still attract qualified workers. Still, whether the 
compensation level needed to attract skilled staff is equal to or lower to the compensation observed in the private 
sector, it is reasonable to think that there is a certain level of pay below which the public administration would find 
it difficult to attract and retain qualified staff.   
3 In addition, SERVIR has been mandated by Law 29615 o f November 18, 2010 to propose a set of five basic laws 
covering civil service reform, one of which refers to public sector pay. 3 
 
and  Vijverberg,  1989).  After  more  than  20  years  from  the  contribution  of  Van  der  Gaag, 
Stelcner  and  Vijverberg,  econometric  analysis  can  take  advantage  of  the  large  amount  of 
household  data  currently  available  for  Peru.  We  compare  public  sector  and  formal  private 
sector wages by using 2009 data from the Encuesta Nacional de Hogares (ENAHO). The ENAHO 
is a rich source of information. Using ENAHO data, the analysis of public-private sector wage 
differentials can be based on more than 16,000 observations. The large amount of information 
available allowed controlling for variables which might affect the wage levels, such as the level 
of  education,  the  working  experience,  the  gender,  the  marital  status  and  the  location 
(urban/rural) of the employees included in the sample.  
Finally, this paper investigates how much of the difference between public and formal private 
sector wages is actually driven by the specific characteristics of the individuals employed in 
each sector. The evaluation of the remaining part, i.e. the “unexplained difference” of the wage 
differential will provide valuable information to determine whether public sector employees in 
Peru earn a wage premium which is independent from their specific characteristics and skills. 
To breakdown the wage differentials into an explained and an unexplained part, the Oaxaca-
Blinder approach is used.  
The topic of wage differential in Peru has been already considered in the past. In the late 1980s, 
Van der Gaag, Stelcner and Vijverberg (1989) used a switching regression model to show that 
public sector wages offered in Peru are well below those in the private sector. The rationale 
behind public sector penalties might be that lower wages in the public sector compensate a less 
competitive working environment and a level of job security which is obviously higher in the 
public sector. More recently, empirical contributions which based their estimations on 1990s 
household survey data (Panizza and Quiang, 1999; Panizza, 2001) found evidence of a public 
sector premium in Latin America, particularly for female workers. Empirical evidence of a public 
sector premium has been found also outside Latin America. Heitmueller (2006) found evidence 
of  a public  sector  premium  for  women  in  Scotland by  using  a  switching  regression  model. 
Gibson (2009) found a public sector premium in Australia, Canada, Great Britain and United 
States by using propensity score matching. According to the theoretical literature, public sector 
premia might be the result of different factors, including: (i) a higher level of unionization in the 
public sector (Holmlund, 1993); (ii) softer budget constraint faced by the public sector (Gregory 
and Borland, 1999); (iii) tighter no-shirking constraint in the public sector, given the higher firing 
costs (Panizza, 2001).   
The structure of the note is the following: after this introduction, section 2 describes the data 
and  the  variables  used;  section  3  explains  the  methodology  adopted;  section  4  shows  the 
results of the estimations; finally section 5 concludes.  4 
 
2. Data 
The  data  used  in  this  study  are  drawn  from  the  national  household  survey  (the  Encuesta 
Nacional de Hogares, ENAHO) carried out by the Peruvian Instituto Nacional de Estadística e 
Informática (INEI). The ENAHO is an invaluable source of information which in 2009 covered 
more  than  20,000  households.  The  survey  collects  extensive  data  on  socioeconomic 
information as well as labor force activities, including whether the members of the households 
work in the public or the private sector, both formal and informal.
4 Based on 2009 survey, 
15,613 employees provided information on their salary and the sector where they work (public 
or private). In particular, wage data  are available for 3,670 public sector workers and 11,943 
private sector workers (see Table 1).
5 Only one-third of these private sector workers have a 
formal contract (4032 private sector employees have a formal contract). 
In order to analyze the differential between public sector and private sector pay, compensation 
has been computed by aggregating wages, in -kind payments, and bonuses. In addition,  we 
focus on hourly compensation rather than annual earnings. As discussed by Blinder (1976) and 
Blomquist  (1978),  the  estimation  of  an  earning  function  based  on  annual  earnings  ma y 
confound pay  differences and issues related to the amount of labor supplied .  Based on 
descriptive statistics in Table 1, public sector pays higher wages than the private sector (8.81 vs 
4.34 Nuevos soles per hour). Also total hourly compensation is higher in the public sector (9.38 
vs 5.29 Nuevos soles).
6 However, caution is needed to interpret the se results because of the 
different characteristics among workers in the two sectors and the fact that the private sector 
includes both formal and informal workers.  
Table 1 also displays data on education attainment, age, marital status and whether worker s 
live in an  urban or rural  location.  Data shows that public sector employees achieved, on 
average, higher levels of education. The average age in the public sector is 41 years. Workers 
are younger in the private sector (32 years). The percentage of married employees and female 
employees is higher in the public sector.
7 
 
                                                           
4 In 2010, ENAHO won the first prize of the World Bank Award to the Innovation in Statistics. 
5 Public and private sector workers are defined based on their responses to the ENAHO (question #510). Different 
classifications  have  been  used  to  test  for  the  robustness  of  the  compensation  differential  analysis  (i.e., 
including/excluding soldiers, public company employees, special servi ce firms (SERVICE) employees). Results are 
qualitatively the same.  
6 It is important to note that private sector employees work longer hours. Because of this, take-home pay might be 
higher for private sector employees even if hourly compensation is lower. 
7 Two tables summarizing descriptive statistics for the female (Table A.1 – Panel A) and male population (Table A.1 
– Panel B) are provided in Annex 1. 5 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics  
 
A preliminary analysis of the statistical distribution of public and private sector wages seems to 
suggest the existence of a public sector premium in Peru. The comparison of the distributions of 
public sector and private sector wages (see Graph 1) suggests three main differences: (a) the 
mean for public sector wages is higher than in the private sector; (b) the skewness of the public 
sector  wage  distribution  is  negative  whereas  the  skewness  of  the  private  sector  wage 
distribution is positive; (c) the standard deviation of the private sector distribution is larger. 
Two preliminary hypotheses stem from these findings: (i) the higher variation in private sector 
wages could be the consequence of the higher degree of informality in the private sector (many 
employees without a contract which earn  much lower wages); (ii) the differential between 
means in the two sectors (and the negative skewness of the public sector distribution) might be 
the  consequence  of  a  public  sector  that  hires,  on  average,  people  with  a  higher  level  of 








Number of observations 15613 3670 11943 4032
Average # of hours worked per week 43.6 40.6 44.5 49.6
Average hourly wage 5.39 8.81 4.34 7.01
Employees receiving  in kind compensation 43.1% 24.7% 48.7% 50.7%
Average in kind compensation per hour  0.33 0.09 0.41 0.46
Employees receiving  bonus over the last year  35.1% 64.0% 26.3% 61.9%
Average hourly value of bonus   0.53 0.48 0.54 1.58
Total Hourly Compensation
(including in-kind compensation and bonuses) 
6.25 9.38 5.29 9.05
Completed & Non-Completed Primary 17.7% 5.6% 21.4% 7.5%
Completed & Non-Completed Secondary 41.8% 22.2% 47.9% 38.7%
Non-Completed Post-Secondary 12.1% 10.8% 12.5% 16.3%
Completed Post-Secondary (Non-University) 13.9% 24.6% 10.6% 19.3%
Completed Post-Secondary (University) 11.9% 29.0% 6.6% 15.4%
Completed Post-Secondary (Postgraduate) 2.6% 7.8% 1.0% 2.8%
Average Age 34.2 40.6 32.3 35.2
Females 32.8% 42.5% 29.8% 30.1%
Married  27.1% 44.8% 21.7% 32.3%
Urban (>400 households) 75.0% 81.2% 73.1% 90.0%
Note: The average of in-kind compensation and bonus is computed at the sector level6 
 
The higher degree of informality in the private sector could play an important role in explaining 
wage differentials. A comparison between public sector and private sector needs to take into 
account the issue of the higher degree of informality that exists in the private sector. The 
analysis of ENAHO data shows that: (i) a large number of individuals working in the private 
sector do not have a formal contract; (ii) individuals without a formal contract earn much lower 
salaries. As a consequence, it is important to control for the “informality issue” in order to 
perform a consistent comparison between public and private sector wages. To address this 
issue, all the private sector employees without a formal contract have been excluded from the 
analysis.
 8 Therefore, the focus of the analysis will be on the comparison between public sector 
and formal private sector workers (columns 2 and 4 of Table 1, respectively).
9  
Higher levels of education might explain the higher average level of compensation in the public 
sector.  On average,  the  public sector hires more educated people than the private sector . 
Based on the sample of ENAHO, more than 60% of public sector workers completed some kind 
of post-secondary education and only 5.6% of employees did not  start a secondary education 
course. In contrast, the percentage of private sector workers with a post -secondary degree 
(18.2%) is lower than the share of public sector workers that completed just primary education 
(21.4%).  Interestingly,  the  average  education  level  of  private  sector  worker s  improves 
significantly when we exclude from the sample those workers without a formal contract.  A 
significant part of formal private sector workers (37.5%) achieved a post-secondary education 
level whereas only 7.5% did not start a secondary education course (see Table 1). People with 
higher education tend to earn higher wages; average salaries in the public sector may be higher 
as a result of the differential of the education in the labor forces . To  take this issue into 
account, we distinguished  between people with higher or lower education while comparing 
public and privates sector wages. If higher education is one of the drivers of higher wages in the 
public sector,  wage differentials should shrink once we control for the level of instruction.  
Results in Figure 2 corroborate this hypothesis. 
The analysis of the statistical distributions of compensation for each education levels provides 
additional information  (see  Figure 3).
10  The  public sector distribution for the three highest 
                                                           
8 The issue of formality has been considered under the legalistic definition based on the right to a retirement 
pension linked to employment. Even if data on the right to a retirement pension are not directly available, the 
existence  of  a  formal  contract  between  employer  and  employee  is  considered  to  be  a  reasonable  signal  of 
formality.  
9 The analysis of the distribution of public sector and formal private sector compensation allows to compute and 
compare wage compression ratios in Peru. The compression ratio, computed as the ratio between the 90
th 
percentile and the 10
th percentile of the population, is much higher in the formal private sector (9.4) than in the 
public sector (3.1). 
10 Female and male pay distributions for each education level are presented in Annex 1 (Table A1.2  – Panel A and 
Panel B).  
 7 
 
education  levels  is  significantly  leptokurtic  whereas  private  sector  distributions  are  much 
flatter. Moreover, the right tail of the private sector pay distribution is heavier than the right 
tail of public sector pay distributions for each level of education and, in particular, for post-
secondary education levels. The shape of the distributions suggests the signaling power of a 
post-secondary  degree  in  the  public  sector.  Once  a  particular  post-secondary  degree  is 
achieved,  compensation  hovers  around  a  certain  level  without  major  variations.  On  the 
contrary, private sector wages differ significantly within the same level of education. This higher 
degree of variation is probably the consequence of a closer link between performance and 
compensation in the private sector.  
3. Methodology 
To analyze the differential between public sector and private sector compensation in Peru we 
followed three different estimation approaches. The first approach consisted in estimating a 
Mincerian regression with a dummy variable to reflect whether an employee is working in the 
public sector or not, as in Rees and Shah (1995): 
                                                                               
                                                          (Eq. 1) 
where ln(Wi) represents the log of the hourly compensation of the i-th worker; X is a matrix of 
explanatory  variables  (education
11,  experience,  gender,  marital  status,  and  urban/rural 
location); Di
Pub is a dummy which is equal to 1 when the i-th worker is employed in the public 
sector;  and  ε  is  the  error  term.  In  this  setup,  we  will  pay  particular  attention  to  the 
coefficient  . A positive and statistically significant coefficient for   would indicate the presence 
of a public sector premium. 
As a second approach, we distinguished two different Mincerian equations for the public and 
the formal private sector. In contrast to Equation (1), by estimating two separate equations we 
allow the coefficients on the explanatory variables (the vector  ) to differ according to the 
sector  considered.  As  underlined  by  Panizza,  this  allows  us  to  capture  different  returns  to 
education, experience and other individual-specific characteristics across sectors. This implies 
the estimation of the following two equations:  
                                                           
11 The education dummy variables measure the level of education achieved by each individual, including: non-
completed  and  completed  primary  education;  non-completed  and  completed  secondary  education;  non-
completed  post-secondary  education;  completed  post-secondary  education  (non-university);  completed  post-
secondary  education  (university);  completed  post-secondary  education  (postgraduate).  Each  single  dummy 
variable takes value 1 if an individual achieved a level of education equal or higher than the level measured by the 
dummy variable. For instance, if an individual has completed secondary education, dummy variables for primary 
and secondary education will take value 1; dummy variables for non-completed and completed post-secondary 
education will take value 0. 
 8 
 
                                                                   
                 
                                                     (Eq. 2) 
                                                                   
                 
                                                         (Eq. 3) 
Crucially, the results from estimating these regressions can be used to decompose the raw 
differences in average earnings between the public and the private sector into: (i) difference 
explained  by  worker  characteristics  (endowments)  and  (ii)  unexplained  difference,  that  is 
thought to be related to different returns to worker characteristics across sectors (Blinder, 
1973;  Oaxaca,  1973).  For  example,  the  extent  to  which  education  affect  wages  might  be 
different in the public and private sector. Formally, this is shown in Equation (4) below: 
                                                                                                                         (Eq. 4) 
where              and             are the mean log hourly wages of workers in public and formal private 
sector, respectively;             and             are the mean characteristics of workers in the two sectors; 
     and     are the vectors of returns to worker characteristics estimated from (2) and (3); 
and    is a “non-discriminatory” vector of coefficients which measures the return to worker 
characteristics that would exist if returns would not differ across sectors. Therefore, we have a 
“two-fold” decomposition where the first component –                               – is the part of the pay 
differential that is “explained” by group differences in the predictors (the “quantity effect”) 
whereas the second component –                                                 – is the “unexplained 
part”  which  can  be  attributed  to  discrimination  and  also  captures  all  potential  effects  of 
differences  in  unobserved  variables.  Following  Reimers  (1983),  we  used  the  average 
coefficients over both groups as an estimate for the “non-discriminatory” parameter vector   . 
The third approach takes a step further by dealing with potential selection bias. If workers are 
not  randomly  distributed  across  sectors  (which  is  plausible,  especially  if  there  is  a  wage 
differential between sectors), there might be a selection bias problem. OLS estimations for 
equations (2) and (3) would be biased if some unobserved characteristics which affect wage 
levels  are  correlated  with  characteristics  which  influence the probability  of  working  in  one 
sector or the other. It is therefore important to model the selection process and underline the 
consequences of non-random sorting between the public sector and the formal private sector. 
Van der Gaag, Stelcner and Vijverberg (1989) modeled the selection process as follows: 
  
                                                                               (Eq. 5) 
where    is a partially observed index that describes the selection process. We observe the 
outcome (public or formal private sector job) depending on whether     is positive or negative. 
We set   = 1 (the worker belongs to the public sector) if        and   = 0 (the worker belongs to 9 
 
the formal private sector) if        . Taking both the wage functions and the selection process 
into account, the model described by equations (2), (3) and (5) can be summarized as follows 
(Heckman, 1979): 
                         
      
        
                                          (Eq. 6) 
                         
      
        
                                              (Eq. 7) 
where         and          are the standard deviations of   
   and   
   , respectively;         is 
the covariance between    
   and   ;        is the covariance between    
   and   ; and      
and      represent the inverse Mills ratio, i.e. the ratio of the normal density function over the 
cumulative distribution function. If                    , OLS will yield unbiased estimates of the 
wage equations (2) and (3). Otherwise, a correction for the selection bias is needed. 
Following  the  same  approach  of  Anós  Casero  and  Seshan  (2006),  we  tackled  this  issue  by 
adopting a two-stage estimation method. In the first stage, we estimated probit equations to 
determine which variables affect the probability of working in the public sector and in the 
private sector. Based on these estimates, a selection term   (the inverse Mills ratio) was built 
and added to each wage equation: 
                  
                          
                                              (Eq. 8) 
                                                
                            
                                                (Eq. 9) 
This  approach  allowed  estimating  the  wage  regressions  consistently  by  using  OLS.  Finally, 
estimates  of  the  selectivity-corrected  equations  were  used  to  obtain  the  Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition of wage differentials into an explained part (driven by differences in average 
worker characteristics) and an unexplained portion (driven by  differences in the returns to 
worker characteristics between the public sector and the formal private sector).  
4. Results  
The analysis of wage differentials in Peru was performed following the approach outlined in the 
previous  section.  The  first  estimation  approach  consists  in  estimating  a  log-wage  equation 
which includes a dummy variable to control for public sector employment (Rees and Shah, 
1995).  Estimation  results  suggest  the  presence  of  a  public  sector  premium  in  Peru  when 
considering only monetary wages. According to the estimations of Equation 1, public sector 
hourly wages are 1.07 Nuevos soles, or 12 percent higher than in the formal private sector, 10 
 
ceteris paribus (see Table 2 – Wages Only column).
12 When considering also the impact of in-
kind compensation and bonuses, the sign of the public sector dummy changes to negative (see 
Table 2  –  Total  Compensation  column).  Total compensation  in the formal  private  sector  is 
higher  (1.06  Nuevos  soles  per  hour,  or  11  percent).  This  underscores  the  importance  of 
considering non-monetary compensation when comparing salaries in the public and private 
sector.
13  
Table 2. OLS Estimation Results 
 
The coefficients estimated for the rest of explanatory variables show the expected sign and 
significance. Education has the expected positive sign on compensation. For example, a worker 
with secondary education is estimated to have a total compensation 1.33 Nuevos soles higher 
than a worker who achieved just primary education.
14 Given our modeling strategy, the impact 
of higher levels of education can be computed using the cumulative impact of all education 
levels achieved. This is because a worker that has completed post -secondary education would 
also have completed all lower levels of education.  
In keeping with the literature, experience is included in the regression both in levels and 
squared to account for non-linearities. As expected, experience has a positive non-linear impact 
                                                           
12 The value of 1.07 Nuevos soles is obtained by taking the exponential of the coefficient   estimated for Equation 
1. 
13 The robustness of results is tested by  re-estimating the log-wage equation after dividing employees into th ree 
categories: professionals, technical experts and auxili aries. The results of this robustness test are presented in 
Annex 2.  
14 The marginal impact is computed by taking the exponential of the coefficient estimated for secondary education 
(0.286). See footnote 6 for details on the structure of education dummies. 
Variables Wages Only Total Compensation
Public Sector Dummy 0.070*** -0.059**
Secondary Education 0.258*** 0.286***
Non Completed Post-Secondary 0.198*** 0.190**
Completed Post-Sec (non University) 0.169*** 0.174***
Completed Post-Sec (University) 0.474*** 0.466***
Postgraduate 0.357*** 0.364***
Age  0.035*** 0.038***






*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.111 
 
on compensation, which increases until an individual is 65 years old and then starts decreasing. 
Finally, an additional set of dummy variables was included in Equation 1 to take into account 
most  relevant  individual-specific  characteristics:  gender,  marital  status  and  urban/rural 
location. When focusing on gender, results show that women earn a lower salary than men 
(1.20 Nuevos soles per hour, or 13 percent of the average compensation). Results also show 
that hourly wages are higher for married employees (1.12 Nuevos soles per hour) and people 
living in an urban location (1.13 Nuevos soles per hour).  The explanatory power of the model is 
in line with that of other standard Mincerian regressions. 
The second estimation approach consists in estimating the Mincerian regressions separately for 
the public and the formal private sector (Equations 2 and 3). To do so, we followed a two-step 
approach to correct for potential selection bias. In the first step, probit equations are estimated 
to understand which variables affect the probability of working in the public sector or in the 
formal private sector. The first probit equation estimates the probability of working in the 
public sector. Therefore, its dependent variable takes value 1 if the i-th worker is employed in 
the public sector and value 0 if she is a formal or informal private sector employee (results are 
shown in the first column of Table 3). The second probit equation follows the same approach. 
Its dependent variable takes value 1 if the i-th worker is a formal private sector employee and 
value 0 if she is a public sector employee or an informal private sector employee (results are 
shown in the second column of Table 3).  
Table 3. Probit Estimation Results 
 
All  variables  included  in  Equation  1  affect  significantly  wage  levels.  Therefore,  they  are  all 
potentially relevant to affect the selection of the public/private sector and need to be included 
in the probit equations (Van der Gaag, Stelcner and Vijverberg, 1987). In addition, we included 
Variables Public Sector Formal Private Sector
Secondary Education 0.762*** 0.393***
Non Completed Post-Secondary 0.458*** 0.249***
Completed Post-Sec (non University) 0.347*** 0.252***
Completed Post-Sec (University) 0.674*** 0.261***
Postgraduate 0.283*** -0.073
Age  0.105*** 0.092***




Large cities dummy -0.653*** 0.416***
Observations 3670 4032
Pseudo R-squared 0.261 0.185
McFadden's Pseudo R2 evaluates the goodness-of-fit of the models.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.112 
 
a  large  city  (more  than  100,000  households)  dummy  in  the  probit  equations.  The  aim  of 
including the large city dummy is to exploit the information content stemming from the fact 
that living in a large city might affect the percentage of opportunities of working in the public or 
private sector. Because of scale effects, the proportion of public sector employees in a large city 
is expected to be lower. In fact, in our data set the share of people employed in the public 
sector is smaller in large cities: public sector workers account for 15 percent of workers in our 
sub-sample of large cities while they account for 25 percent of workers in all other urban areas. 
At the same time, the large city dummy has a relatively muted impact on wage levels with 
respect to the urban/rural dummy. Pay differentials between urban and non-urban employees 
are considerable (7.1 versus 3.6 Nuevos soles per hour) while the differential between large city 
workers and the rest of urban workers is smaller (8.0 versus 6.8 Nuevos soles per hour). In 
addition, the correlation between compensation and the large city dummy (0.08) is smaller 
than  the  correlation  between  compensation  and  the  urban/rural  dummy  (0.18).  This  is 
important for our estimation strategy since a variable that affects the sector of employment but 
does not directly affect wages is needed for the two-step approach followed.  
Results in Table 3 show that education affects in a positive way the participation into the public 
and  formal  private  sectors.  However,  a  comparison  between  the  two  columns  of  Table  3 
highlights how education has a stronger impact on the probability of working in the public 
sector. The relationship between age and labor force participation is non-linear. In the public 
sector, the probability of participation increases until workers reach the age of 58 years. In the 
formal private sector, the turning point is much lower. The probability of participation increases 
until workers reach the age of 38 years and then starts decreasing. This is consistent with the 
well-known  pattern  by which  participation  in  self-employment  rises  with  age  (World  Bank, 
2007).  Given  that  self-employment  is  largely  informal  in  Peru,  this  would  explain  why 
participation in the formal private sector declines from a relatively young age.  
Individual-specific  characteristics  are  also  very  important  to  determine  where  to  work. 
Interestingly, results underline that the probability of working in the public sector increases for 
women. Consistent results are found when focusing on the formal private sector since the 
probability of working in the private sector is lower for women.  
Other individual-specific characteristics are relevant, too. Being married affects positively the 
participation in both the public and the formal private sectors but the probability of working in 
the public sector is higher. Finally, both urban dummies show a significant coefficient. Living in 
an  urban  location  increases  the  probability  of  working  in  the  formal  private  sector  and 13 
 
decreases the chance of working in the public sector.
 15 Living in a large city (such as Lima or 
Arequipa) increases further the chance to work in the formal private sector. 
Based on the results of these estimations, the inverse Mills ratios were constructed and added 
as an additional explanatory variable (the “selection term”  ) to the wage equations (2) and (3). 
This approach (Heckman, 1979) allows us to estimate the wage equations consistently using 
OLS (see Section 3 – Equations 8 and 9).  
Estimations of wage equations (8) and (9) show that returns to education are significant, both 
in the public and the formal private sector (see Table 4). The comparison of estimation results 
shows that returns to education are generally higher in the public sector. However, returns to 
postgraduate education are significantly higher in the formal private sector. In addition, note 
how returns to non-university (technical) post-secondary education are not significant in the 
formal private sector. This contrasts with the positive impact that completed non-university 
post-secondary education has on wages within the public sector, as shown in the fourth graph 
of Figure 3. As discussed above, this may be related to the importance of formal qualifications 
to determine compensation within the public sector. 
Table 4. Selectivity Corrected Compensation Equations Estimation Results 
 
Compensation is also significantly affected by experience, gender and family status. However, 
experience (proxied by age) influences compensation only in the public sector. The impact is 
positive until workers reach 57 years of age, then its sign switches.  
                                                           
15 In a large city, the percentage of opportunities in the public sector is likely to be smaller.  
Variables Public Sector Formal Private Sector
Secondary Education 0.508*** 0.105**
Non Completed Post-Secondary 0.210*** 0.161***
Completed Post-Sec (non University) 0.282*** 0.064
Completed Post-Sec (University) 0.567*** 0.411***
Postgraduate 0.295*** 0.617***
Age  0.063*** 0.007




Selection Term 0.197*** -0.279***
Observations 3670 4032
Chi-squared 541.0 853.5
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.114 
 
On the gender differentiation issue, results confirm the findings of the first set of estimations 
(Table  2).  On  average,  female  workers  earn  lower  salaries.  Moreover,  the  gender  penalty 
appears to be stronger in the private sector.  
Finally, being married has a positive effect on compensation in both the public and the formal 
private sector. Coefficients estimated to control for urban/rural location are not significant. 
The third and last estimation approach focuses on what drives pay differentials between the 
public and the formal private sector. Pay differentials are the result of different human capital 
endowments and other unobservable factors. The well-known Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition 
described above (Equation 4) can be used to break down the difference between public and 
formal  private  sector  compensation  into  an  “explained  difference”,  which  is  the  result  of 
differences in the observable characteristics affecting  compensation (education, experience, 
gender, marital status, and location), and an “unexplained difference” which summarizes the 
difference in returns to the aforementioned observable characteristics and also captures all 
potential  effects  of  differences  in  unobserved  variables.  Results  of  this  decomposition  are 
shown in Table 5.  
The  first  column  of  the  table  focuses  on  the  whole  sample.  The  overall  difference  is  not 
statistically significant (-0.022). However, it is important to note that this result stems from two 
factors at play that off-set each other. On one hand, the endowment coefficient is negative and 
statistically significant (-0.231), meaning that the observed compensation in the public sector is 
lower than expected given the employees’ endowments, such as higher education and greater 
experience. On the other hand, the coefficient on returns is positive and statistically significant 
(0.209),  meaning  that  returns  to  education  and  the  remaining  workers’  characteristics  are 
higher in the formal private sector.  






Ed. Lvl. 1 Ed. Lvl. 2 Ed. Lvl. 3 Ed. Lvl. 4 Ed. Lvl. 5 Ed. Lvl. 6
Explained Difference 
(Endowments)
-0.231*** 0.037 -0.040** -0.084*** -0.082*** -0.115*** -0.090**
Unexplained 
Difference (Returns)
0.209*** 1.255* 0.222 0.271* 0.084 0.117* 0.668***
Observations 7702 509 2374 1055 1679 1685 400
0.002 0.002 0.577***
Note: Mean log wage differentials are computed by subtracting public sector wages from formal 
private sector wages.
-0.022 1.292* 0.182 0.187 Log Wage Difference15 
 
We repeated the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition for each sub-sample of workers with a specific 
education level. This approach allows controlling for the specific features of a public sector 
which hire, on average, employees with a higher level of education. As shown in Table 5, results 
change across the different levels of education. Significantly, when focusing on the sub-sample 
of employees that achieved a postgraduate degree (see Table 5 - Education Level 6), the hourly 
compensation  offered  by  the  formal  private  sector  is  higher  (0.577).  Differences  are  less 
significant  for  lower  levels  of  education.  Higher  compensation  for  formal  private  sector 
employees with a postgraduate degree is the consequence of the higher returns provided by 
the  formal  private  sector  (0.668).  Note  that  even  within  levels  of  education,  there  are 
differences in endowments between public and formal private sector employees. The negative 
signs  in  the  second  row  of  Table  5  indicate  that,  given  the  endowments  of  public  sector 
workers, one would have expected higher wages. These coefficients are driven by the fact that 
excluding education characteristics, public sector employees still have more experience and a 
greater proportion of public sector workers are married (see Table 1). The focus on individual 
levels of education highlights that the potential lack of competitiveness by the public sector in 
attracting qualified workers appears to be concentrated at the highest levels of education, 
particularly at the postgraduate level. This would suggest that public sector pay reforms under 
consideration may involve increases to compensation for the most educated employees.  
5. Conclusions 
Our analysis suggests a number of main conclusions on the structure of public sector pay, the 
differences  in  pay  between  the  public  and  private  sector,  and  the  factors  behind  such 
differences. 
In the public sector the distribution of the hourly compensation has a particularly acute peak 
(leptokurtic distribution) for the highest levels of education. Once a worker achieves a post-
secondary degree, compensation hovers around a certain level without major variations. This 
suggests that the public sector is using a post-secondary degree as a driver of compensation. In 
contrast, formal private sector wages differ significantly within the same level of education. This 
higher degree of variation is probably the consequence of a closer link between performance 
and compensation in the formal private sector.  
If  we  consider  only  wages,  there  is  a  public  sector  premium  in  Peru  when  controlling  for 
education,  experience,  gender,  marital  status  and  urban/rural  location  of  the  employees. 
However, the results change when we include in-kind payment and bonuses and undertake the 
Mincerian regression analysis on the basis of total hourly compensation. Indeed, when using 
total compensation estimation results show that formal private sector compensation in Peru is 
higher than in the public sector. This underscores the importance of including non-monetary 16 
 
compensation when calculating public-private sector pay differentials, an issue to which the 
literature pays insufficient attention. 
When self-selection is taken into account, pay differentials lose significance when we focus on 
the whole sample. However, private sector premium is still present for workers with the highest 
level of education. Results from the Oaxaca – Blinder decomposition show that this differential 
is driven by the higher returns offered by the formal privates sector to those workers that 
achieved a higher level of education.  
Finally,  the  analysis  allows  investigating  the  issue  of  wage  differentials  from  the  gender 
perspective. Results show that female workers earn a lower salary in Peru and that the gender 
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 Figure 1. Pay distributions by sector (Logs) 
 
 Source: Authors’ calculations based on ENAHO. 
 Figure 2. Mean public and formal private sector pays at different education levels 
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Figure 3. Hourly Pay Distributions by Education Level 
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Annex 1 – Public vs. Private Sector Compensation, Breakdown by Gender 
Table A1.1 – Descriptive Statistics, Breakdown by Gender  
Panel A. Male Population   All  Public Sector  Private Sector 
Formal Private 
Sector 
# of Observations  10499  2111  8388  2820 
Average Hourly Wage (Nuevos soles)  5.46  9.04  4.56  7.36 
Standard Deviation (Log of Wage)  0.88  0.68  0.84  0.74 
Skewness (Log of Wage)  0.06  0.30  0.15  0.70 
Non-Completed Primary (%)   9.2%  2.8%  10.8%  3.4% 
Completed Primary (%)  9.6%  4.1%  10.9%  5.0% 
Non-Completed Secondary (%)  17.2%  5.6%  20.1%  10.8% 
Completed Secondary (%)  29.6%  22.2%  31.5%  33.1% 
Non-Completed Post-Secondary (%)  11.6%  11.4%  11.6%  15.6% 
Completed Post-Secondary (%)  22.8%  53.9%  15.0%  32.1% 
Average Age  34.4  41.5  32.6  36.3 
Married (%)  28.3%  49.1%  23.1%  36.6% 
Urban (%, >400 households)  72.6%  78.9%  71.0%  88.8% 
Large Cities (%, >100,000 
households)  21.6%  14.0%  23.5%  35.1% 
 
Panel B. Female Population  All  Public Sector  Private Sector 
Formal Private 
Sector 
# of Observations  5114  1559  3555  1212 
Average Hourly Wage (Nuevos soles)  5.20  7.70  3.75  6.19 
Standard Deviation (Log of Wage)  0.98  0.71  0.91  0.73 
Skewness (Log of Wage)  -0.13  -0.39  0.10  0.48 
Non-Completed Primary (%)   9.6%  2.2%  12.8%  2.5% 
Completed Primary (%)  5.9%  1.6%  7.8%  3.0% 
Non-Completed Secondary (%)  9.8%  3.1%  12.7%  4.2% 
Completed Secondary (%)  21.8%  11.6%  26.2%  22.3% 
Non-Completed Post-Secondary (%)  13.3%  10.1%  14.7%  17.9% 
Completed Post-Secondary (%)  39.7%  71.5%  25.7%  50.2% 
Average Age  33.9  39.3  31.5  32.5 
Married (%)  24.7%  39.0%  18.5%  22.4% 
Urban (%, >400 households)  79.9%  84.3%  78.0%  92.7% 
Large Cities (%, >100,000 
households)  25.4%  15.1%  29.9%  43.6% 
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Table A1.2 – Panel A: Hourly Pay Distributions by Education Level (Female Population) 
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Table A1.2 – Panel B: Hourly Pay Distributions by Education Level (Male Population) 
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Annex 2. Public vs. Private Sector Compensation across working categories 
An alternative approach to investigate the existence of compensation differentials between the public 
and  the  formal  private  sector  is  to  use  ENAHO  data  to  distinguish  employees  based  on  their 
responsibilities and the service provided and verify the existence of compensation differential within 
each group. In particular, compensation differentials in Peru can be analyzed after dividing employees 
into the following categories: professionals, technical experts and so-called “auxiliaries” (i.e., support 
staff or ‘auxiliaries’) (SERVIR, 2010). 
In order to test the robustness of the results obtained by this study, we used the same approach 
followed by SERVIR (2010) to disaggregate the data sample and estimated the log-wage equation (Rees 
and Shah, 1995) for each occupational group. Table A2.1 shows some descriptive statistics useful to 
contextualize the analysis. The majority of respondents belong to the Technical experts’ category. As for 
professionals, the large part of respondents is employed in the public sector (with a proportion close to 
4:1) whereas the majority of technical experts and auxiliaries work in the formal private sector. Average 
values  for  total  compensation  are  consistent  with  our  expectations.  When  we  focus  on  total 
compensation, we notice that compensation is significantly for professionals and, generally, for those 
one working in the formal private sector. 
Table A2.1. Descriptive statistics 






Number of observations   1633  2178  1892 
Number of observations (sub-sample: public sector)  1282  783  505 
Number of observations (sub-sample: private sector)  351  1395  1387 
Total Hourly Compensation 
(including in-kind compensation and bonuses)  
12.96  9.74  7.24 
Total Hourly Compensation (sub-sample: public sector)  12.47  9.37  5.45 
Total Hourly Compensation (sub-sample: private sector)  14.77  9.95  7.90 
  
Regression analysis provides a further insight. Total compensation is significantly higher in the formal 
private sector for technical experts and support staff (auxiliares). The empirical evidence is less clear for 
professionals. The sign of the public sector dummy suggests a lower compensation for public sector 
professionals but the difference is not statistically significant. This result is rather surprising since we 
expected a more pronounced private sector premium for professionals. The coefficients estimated for 
the rest of the explanatory variables are consistent with our expectations. Education matters, especially 25 
 
for professionals and technical experts. Female employees earn a lower compensation, especially in the 
auxiliaries’ category. Both the marital status and the location dummy have a positive impact on total 
compensation. Finally, experience positively affects compensation but its impact is more evident for 
technical experts and auxiliaries. 





Public Sector Dummy -0.032 -0.119*** -0.150***
Secondary Education 0.782*** 0.254** 0.223***
Non Completed Post-Secondary 0.068 0.252*** 0.141***
Completed Post-Sec (non University) 0.344*** 0.035 0.067
Completed Post-Sec (University) 0.427*** 0.328*** 0.041
Postgraduate 0.294*** 0.452*** "o"
Age  0.018 0.031*** 0.027***
Age Squared (/100) -0.011 -0.017 -0.016*
Female -0.194*** -0.151*** -0.396***
Married 0.069** 0.114*** 0.149***
Urban 0.038*** 0.155*** 0.139***
Observations 1633 2178 1892
R-squared 0.185 0.237 0.187
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, "o" when omitted for collinearity
 
The absence of a significant private sector premium for the professionals’ category is surprising and 
deserves  further  attention.  We  looked  at  the  different  professions  included  in  the  sample  of 
professionals and realized that results could be biased by the composition of the sample. We found that 
a large share of employees belonging to the group of professionals is constituted by teachers (66.4 
percent).  Teachers  work  mainly  in  the  public  sector  and  earn  significantly  less  than  the  other 
professionals in the sample. In addition, compensation is particularly low for teachers working in the 
private sector. They earn 53 percent less than other professionals working in the public sector and 57 
percent less than other private sector professionals (see the last two columns of Table A2.3). Therefore, 
it is difficult to compare them with other professionals, at least when focusing on compensation.  
The lower compensation of teachers is probably biasing the estimation of the log-wage equation. To 
verify this, we re-estimated the model after excluding teachers from the group of professionals. Results 
of the analysis confirm our suspects. Coefficients estimated differ according to the sample considered. 
This highlights the heterogeneity of a sample which put together teachers with the rest of professionals. 
In particular, the private sector premium grows significantly after excluding teachers from the sample up 
to  the  point  of  being  higher  than  private  sector  premia  estimated  for  the  technical  experts  and 
auxiliaries’  categories.  Implications  of  these  results  are  twofold:  compensations  for  teachers  in  the 26 
 
public sector are already high and do not need further adjustments; compensations in the private sector 
are significantly higher for professionals, especially when we exclude teachers from the sample.  
Table A2.3. Descriptive statistics 




Number of observations   1633  1084  549 
Number of observations (sub-sample: public sector)  1282  937  345 
Number of observations (sub-sample: private sector)  351  147  204 
Total  Hourly  Compensation 
(including in-kind compensation and bonuses)   12.96  10.21  18.38 
Total Hourly Compensation (sub-sample: public sector)  12.47  10.5  17.82 
Total Hourly Compensation (sub-sample: private sector)  14.77  8.41  19.35 
 






Public Sector Dummy -0.032 0.294*** -0.186***
Secondary Education 0.782*** 0.733** "o"
Non Completed Post-Secondary 0.068 0.079 0.645*
Completed Post-Sec (non University) 0.344*** 0.300*** 0.639
Completed Post-Sec (University) 0.427*** 0.314*** 0.411
Postgraduate 0.294*** 0.089* 0.288***
Age  0.018 0.02 0.017
Age Squared (/100) -0.011 -0.015 -0.005
Female -0.194*** -0.122*** -0.175***
Married 0.069** 0.040 0.118*
Urban 0.038*** 0.068* 0.471**
Observations 1633 1084 549
R-squared 0.185 0.211 0.157
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, "o" when omitted for collinearity